magazine issue 6 2008 / Issue 7

Complementing Individualism with The Social Identity Approach

• written by Martijn van Zomeren
• edited by Hans IJzerman

The larger point here is that psychological phenomena that appear to be irrational from an individualist perspective (e.g., riots) may actually be quite functional when viewed from the social identity approach. From this point of view, crowd behavior is not irrational and impulsive, but functionally guided by group norms. Furthermore, the experience of group-based deprivation functionally motivates collective action to fight the group`s disadvantage together with fellow group members. And finally, the experience of emotions more generally on behalf of the collective is equally functional: Group-based guilt motivates reparation behavior towards those oppressed in the past, and group-based anger and fear motivate approach and avoidance of the out-group, respectively. It seems, then, that we have indeed evolved as social animals that are particularly "herdy": We even have a psychological mechanism available that allows individuals to become psychological group members. Therefore, there is no reason to reside with reductionism.

The case of individuals` moral conviction

Psychology has recently shown renewed interest in the domain of morality – like emotion a realm traditionally governed by the individual self. Whereas recent theorizing has started on universal elements of, and processes associated with, morality (see (Haidt, 2007, for a review; for earlier perspectives see (Bandura, 2000.; (Kohlberg, 1984; for an intercultural perspective, see (Triandis & Suh, 2002), others have developed theoretical accounts of moral conviction: The extent to which individuals hold beliefs on an issue that they subjectively deem to be "absolutely true" (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; (Turiel, 2002). Theory and research suggests extremely negative responses to threats to individuals` moral conviction (Skitka et al., 2005; (Tetlock, 2002)). The general line of thought is that because individuals` convictions are strong and absolute individual attitudes, threats to their conviction threaten the very core of who they are (i.e., their individual self). Thus, one could become enraged because others mock the Qur’an, or one could become enraged because those who mock the Qur’an aim to restrict others` freedom of speech. As a consequence, their responses will be as extreme as their conviction (e.g., attacking those who mock sacred values).

From an outside perspective such extreme acts or responses are of course typically condemned, and perhaps as a consequence perceived as irrational, impulsive, and unreasonable. Similarly, extremists are often viewed as individuals who are so determined that they cannot be reasoned with, and hence they must be either crazy, or dangerous (e.g., terrorists). If this sounds familiar to you, then I might remind you that this sounds quite akin to how LeBon (1895) looked down upon the masses crowding together, and from which he concluded that these individuals must have lost everything what made them rationally human. From the perspective of the social identity approach, however, we should beware of such reductionism and consider the possibility that what might appear to be a madman (e.g., a terrorist) might in fact be a group member attempting to achieve group goals. Please note that this line of thought does not legitimize or excuse extremist actions --- it is simply to understand them better, so that ultimately such actions can be prevented.

Now, this is a good example of where the complementarity of the social identity approach becomes theoretically important and socially consequential. From a reductionist individualism perspective, the strong, extreme, and "universal" elements associated with individuals` moral conviction makes them highly resistant to change, and hence to any social influence. After all, there is little point in talking to a terrorist when we assume he or she has made up his or her mind and is willing to die for it. Or, alternatively, why talk to Muslims if you believe such individuals to be inherently evil? If we assume this individual to be thus, it will be hard to have any effect on him or her. However, we can also consider viewing individuals` moral conviction as something that is not necessarily based in the individual self, but in the group self. For example, my response to `Fitna` may derive from my Dutch rather than my personal moral conviction regarding freedom of speech. If this can be the case, then the social identityapproach suggests that social influence is possible: Namely when it comes from fellow group members. It follows that when the group does not (or no longer) support individuals` group-based moral conviction, negative responses to moral threat should be reduced.