magazine issue 6 2008 / Issue 7

Complementing Individualism with The Social Identity Approach

• written by Martijn van Zomeren
• edited by Hans IJzerman

Applications of the social identity approach

The idea that individuals are rational (and groups are not) is quite an old one. In fact, groups were once thought to result in the loss of everything sacred to the rational individual: Loss of self, loss of self-control, loss of accountability, and loss of rationality (e.g., LeBon, 1895). Group behavior was thus viewed as something clearly irrational, and, by inference and experience, something dangerous. LeBon`s (1895) concept of the group mind, a rather supernatural force, was thought to possess individuals in crowds, resulting in their enactment of the impulsive and irrational passions of the collective. Much later, Zimbardo`s (1969) influential deindividuation theory still suggested this core idea: That deindividuated individuals are likely to fall prey to anti-social behavior (see also Zimbardo, 2008). A quantitative research synthesis suggested however that there was little empirical support for deindividuation theory across the board (Postmes & Spears, 1998). Postmes and Spears (1998) found that results were more in line with a group norm account: Deindividuation appeared to result in conformity to group norms. If these norms were anti-social, anti-social behavior resulted, but when these norms were pro-social, pro-social behavior resulted. Thus, adherence to group norms seemed more influential than individuals` state of deindividuation.

A similar development can be found in research on relative deprivation, which is defined as the experience that one is denied something that one feels entitled to (e.g., Crosby, 1982). This tradition was also rooted in ideas about the irrational nature of collective action, in which relative deprivation was thought to contribute to the so-called breakdown of the social order through motivating irrational and aggressive outbursts of action. Not unlike LeBon`s dangerous crowds that were possessed by thegroup mind, individuals` sense of relative deprivation was thought to result in riots and inter-group aggression. Later research and another quantitative research synthesis however suggested that it is group-based rather than individual deprivation that predicts collective action (H.J. Smith & Ortiz, 2002). Defining one`s deprivation as something collective appeared to lift the burden of individuals` lonely and relatively powerless shoulders, and actually helped to engage in actions that aim to fight their deprivation (Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). The result was that group-based deprivation actually fitted better with solidarity accounts of collective action (in which groups constructively fight for their interests) than with breakdown accounts (in which groups fight to break down the social order).

Moreover, recent theorizing suggests that even individuals` emotions are not always experienced on the basis of the individual self. Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000), for example, showed that participants could be induced to feel anger and fear on the basis of a relevant group membership. In a similar vein, Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) showed that individuals can feel guilt for past wrongdoings of fellow group members. In other words, one can experience emotion on the basis of a group membership that connects one to a past never experienced (see (Zebel, Pennekamp, Van Zomeren, Doosje, Van Kleef, Vliek, & Van der Schalk, 2007). Thus, although your emotions may feel very much your own, they are not always based in your individual self. In at least some instances, they are much more ours than they are uniquely yours.